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ABSTRACT

Through the increasingly common use of devices that provide ubiquitous sensor data
such as wearables, mobile phones, and Internet-connected devices of the sort, privacy
challenges are becoming even more significant. One major challenge that requires more
focus is bystanders' privacy, as there are too few solutions that solve the issue. Of the
solutions available, many of them do not give bystanders a choice in how their private
data is used, Bystanders' privacy has become an afterthought when it comes to data
capture in the forms of photographs, videos, voice recordings, etc. and continues to
remain that way. This thesis provides a solution to enhance bystanders' facial privacy by
developing a wearable device called FacePET that provides a way for bystanders to
protect their privacy and give consent. FacePET was evaluated using experiments to
detect faces in photos when users wore the device and by performing a usability study
with 21 participants. We found that FacePET was successfully able to block 15 of the 21
participants' faces, yielding a success percentage of 71%. We found through the
usability study that a majority of the participants would be willing to use FacePET, or a
similar device, daily for their facial privacy protection.
Keywords: Bystanders' privacy; Face detection; Face recognition; Privacy; Wearables;
Internet of Things.
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Chapter 1. Introduction
1.1 Bystanders' Privacy
According to Ericsson's Mobility Report [1], there are more than four billion
smartphones subscriptions in the world. The availability of these devices with highresolution cameras, mobile Internet connectivity, and the development of artificial
intelligence techniques such as deep learning can expose individuals to privacy issues.
Among these issues is bystanders' privacy [2 - 3] which is the issue that arises when a
device collects sensor data (such as photos, sound or video) that can be used to identify
bystanders who may have not given consent for them to be identified. It is worthy to
note that this issue arises with any camera-enabled Internet of Things (loT) device such
as web/security cameras and drones.
As an example in which bystanders were identified by using photos of their faces
without consent, in 2016 a Russian photographer took photos of bystanders at a subway
station and was able to identify them using free software available on the Internet [4],
The bystanders later knew about their identification through news reports. Examples
like this one underscore the risks that people are exposed to with respect to their facial
privacy given the technology currently available.
Looking at it from a human-computer interaction standpoint, research in the early 2000s
found that cellphone use in public spaces was offensive to some people [5] seeing as
they presented a conflict of social spaces where the user occupied both the physical and
virtual spaces at the same time. With wearable devices in today's world such as smart
glasses also including cameras and microphones, strong privacy concerns are being
provoked by the collection and sharing of data over the Internet without permission,
thereby directly threatening bystanders' space and autonomy [6].
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1.2 Problem Statement
With such a rise in concerns about bystanders' privacy from consumers, there is yet to
be a viable solution that allows for bystanders to be more in control. Most research in
the past decade or so have been more focused on the privacy of the wearer instead of
whoever else's privacy can be affected by the data collection effort. There are several
reasons why this issue needs more attention from researchers and the general
consumers. For one, consumers lack the means to control their privacy when using
wearable devices. Another reason is that bystanders do not want their privacy to be
exposed when somebody is using a wearable device nearby. Lastly, no standard
approach exists to handle third-parties in consumer wearables. Thus, researchers began
developing ways to combat bystander's privacy by various means.

1.3 Our Contribution
We summarize our contributions as follows:
•

The design and implementation of a wearable device, called FacePET, that uses
LED lights to block a camera's ability to detect faces. The device is geared
towards preserving the privacy of whomever is to wear it.

•

A consent protocol over Bluetooth that provides users wearing the FacePET a
way to give consent.

•

A user study on wearable, Internet of Things devices geared towards facial
privacy protection.

Thesis Organization
The first chapter of this thesis includes an introduction of what bystanders' privacy is,
the problem statement, and what our contribution is to the area of study. The second
chapter consists of a general overview of face detection and recognition algorithms, the
methods of bystanders' privacy systems, the design issues of those systems, recent
protection methods developed by other researchers, and an evaluation of how well the
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methods perform. Chapter three provides a description of the wearable system's
development which includes detailed explanations of the system's components as well
as the roles of each built application and how they work. Chapter four analyzes and
discusses the results of the tests done with human participants using the device. Lastly,
chapter five concludes this thesis's research and considers recommendations for future
work.
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Chapter 2. Background
2.1 Introduction
Before getting into our own solution regarding the issue of bystanders' privacy, we must
first study the research and solutions others have done that have helped us get to the
point we are at now. As we go through this chapter, we will analyze and explain exactly
how face detection and recognition work as well as the algorithms that make them
possible. We will also present a taxonomy of bystanders' facial privacy solutions, and a
review of current methods available in the literature to enhance the facial privacy of
bystanders. As a note, the information in this chapter, as well as in Chapter 3, has been
published in the Electronics journal [41].

2.2 Face Detection and Recognition
Even though research in face detection and recognition dates back from the 1970's [7 8], the advent of imaging sensors embedded in smartphones and digital cameras in
conjunction with social networks have made research in the development of these
algorithms to flourish in the last decade. Private companies (e.g., Facebook [9]) in
addition to law enforcement agencies [10 - 11] are using algorithms to detect faces for
business and law enforcement purposes. In computer vision and image processing, face
detection is the problem of detecting if a face is present in a photo/video and face
recognition is the problem of associating a face in a photo/video with an identity.
The processes involved in the detection and recognition of faces in photos and/or video
recordings are presented in Figure 1. Initially photos or videos are captured using some
type of digital camera embedded in an loT device such as a mobile phone, a drone, or
Internet-connected camera (image capture phase). Then, these digital photos/videos
are passed through software that checks if faces are present in the photo/video (face
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detection phase). Finally, if faces are detected, then the face recognition phase is
performed. The output of this last phase are the identities of the detected faces.

Some John Doe
Recognized id

Figure 1. Processes for face detection and recognition.

The development of fast and practical implementations of face detection algorithms in
portable devices was possible through the work of Viola - Jones who developed a face
detector that became a standard technique for this task [12]. Viola - Jones' work is
based on three main ideas [13]: (1) the utilization of an image representation (a data
structure called "integral image") that facilitates the extraction of simple features
(called "Haar-like features"); (2) the utilization of a simple and efficient classifier based
on the AdaBoost machine learning algorithm to select the most promising features to
detect faces; and (3) the utilization of a combination of classifiers organized in sequence
(called "cascade classifiers") which allows to quickly discard regions of the image while
concentrating on the most promising regions where faces may lie [13]. In the algorithm,
a Haar-like feature is calculated as follows [14]:
h(rl, r2) = s(rl) - s(r2)
where s(rl) is the average of the intensities of the pixels in the "white" regions, and
s(r2) is the average of the pixel intensities in the "black" regions as specified by patterns
defined by a Haar-like feature. In their paper, Viola - Jones use the basic Haar-like
features shown in Figure 2.
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Figure 2. Haar-like features in the Viola and Jones face detection algorithm [13].
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The goal on the use of these features is to guide the face detection algorithm to find
better regions of interest in which a face may possibly lie. Before this algorithm was
developed, other algorithms already did face detection, but they relied on techniques
using pixel positions and relations between pixels in an image, with more expensive
computational cost than the Viola - Jones' approach [12].
The Viola - Jones algorithm calculates the values of these Haar-like features by making
use of windows (subregions) with different sizes from the original image. Once the
features are calculated for all windows, the windows are passed through a classifier that
outputs "true" for those windows that may contain a face or "no" otherwise. The goal is
to discard windows that may not have faces in it. The classifier is built as a sequence
(cascade) of (weak) classifiers (Figure 3) in which each consecutive classifier is stronger
than the previous one. These weak classifiers have been previously trained before the

face detection phase is executed by using the AdaBoost algorithm [13]. Once the
windows classified with "yes" have been labeled by the cascade classifier, they may be
passed to more complex algorithms.
In recent years, there have been advancements in face detection using deep learning
methods. Based off of the work from Viola - Jones, there has been success in the
performance of deep learning face detection algorithms using deep convolutional neural
networks (CNN), region-based CNN (RCNN), and Faster R-CNN [15]. Most of the recently
developed methods stem off of the Faster R-CNN and are often able to outperform
traditional computer vision methods by a significant margin in both accuracy and speed.
One such method is the Faster R-CNN coupled with region proposal networks (RPN). An
RPN simultaneously predicts the bounds of an object and objectness scores at each
position, which are used by Faster R-CNN for detection [16].

2.3 General Methods for Bystanders' Facial Privacy Protection
Methods currently available to handle bystanders' facial privacy can fit into two major
groups: location-dependent methods, which deny third-party devices the opportunity to
collect data; and obfuscation-dependent methods which prevent bystanders' facial
detection and identification. The taxonomy used in this paper to classify the methods to
protect bystanders' facial privacy is presented in Figure 4 below.

privacy soiunons

Location-dependent

Obfuscationdependent

Banning/confiscating

Disabling c

devices

Bystander-based

1

Sensor

Broadcasting

saturation

commands

Figure 4. Taxonomv a

Context-based

Default

vstanders' orivai

Selective

Collaborative
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2.3.1 Location-Dependent
The goal of location-dependent methods is to deny the collection of data at particular
shared spaces. Implementation of these methods (such as restaurants, casinos, or cafes)
entails restricting and banning devices' use through warning signs, confiscating devices
before entering a shared space, or temporarily disabling user devices in a shared space.
According to the taxonomy presented in Figure 4, these methods can be further
classified into two categories, namely (1) banning/confiscating devices; and (2) disabling
devices.
In the banning/confiscating devices category, third-party devices are confiscated or
banned for usage at a shared space. This method has been in use since the end of the
19th century when the use of cameras was forbidden at private beaches and, for some
time, at public spaces in the U.S. [17]. As devices cannot be used at the shared space,
the bystanders' facial privacy is protected.
In the disabling devices category, bystanders' facial privacy is protected because thirdparty devices cannot collect data about the bystanders. Devices can be disabled in
shared spaces by using three approaches: sensor saturation, broadcasting commands,
and context-based approaches. In the first approach (sensor saturation), the goal is to
make sensors of third-party devices sense an input signal that is greater than the
maximum possible measurable input supported by third-party devices' sensors (thereby
making the sensors unusable by saturation). An example in this category includes using
near-infrared pulsating lights from fixed devices at shared spaces directed at the
device's camera lens [18] with the goal of saturating the Charge-Coupled Device (CCD)
sensor. Facial privacy is preserved because data cannot be collected when the device's
sensor saturates.
In the second approach (broadcasting commands) under the disabling devices category,
the third-party devices receive some type of command via wireless communication to
disable temporarily the capture of facial data. An example of this category includes the
utilization of Bluetooth and infrared protocols to send disabling commands [19 - 20]. In
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the last category (context-based approaches) under location-dependent methods, thirdparty devices perform some type of context recognition to trigger software actions that
will deny the explicit collection of data by disabling user devices' sensors at shared
spaces.
An example in this category includes the virtual walls approach [21] in which the device
uses contextual information (such as GPS location data) to trigger software actions that
can temporarily disable its sensors based on pre-programmed contextual rules. A
second example in this group is the system developed by Blank et al. [22] in which
camera-enabled drones are restricted from flying over certain areas through rules
established in a website and broadcast to the drones. In this case, bystanders' facial
privacy is preserved because data cannot be collected by third-party devices when the
contexts are recognized, and the device's sensors are disabled.
2.3.2 Obfuscation-Dependent

Obfuscation methods attempt to hide the identity of bystanders to avoid their
identification. These methods can be classified in two groups: (1) bystander-based
obfuscation; and (2) device-based obfuscation.
In bystander-based obfuscation, bystanders take actions to avoid their facial
identification. This might be accomplished by wearing some type of hardware (or
clothing) that hides or perturbs bystanders' identifiable features needed to perform
identification, or by having bystanders perform some type of physical action (for
example, leaving the shared space, or asking a user to stop using a device) to protect
their privacy when bystanders become aware of a device's use in their surroundings that
might infringe upon their privacy [23], Examples in this category include the PrivacyVisor
glasses [14] [24] that hide facial features using near-infrared light or reflective materials,
and the utilization of wearables to impersonate or to hide facial features to deceive
facial detection and recognition algorithms [25], Notification methods that alert
bystanders to protect their privacy include the use of LEDs on wearables to notify
bystanders of video or audio being recorded in their surroundings (such as Snap
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spectacles), and the use of short-range radio broadcasts and WiFi-based communication
protocols to notify bystanders about sensing activity being performed in their proximity
(e.g., NotiSense [23]).
In the last group (device-based obfuscation), the software of third-party devices adds
noise (such as blurring) on collected data to hide bystanders' facial identifiable features.
The software at users' devices might perform obfuscation by default (for example,
blurring all faces detected in a photo or a video), it might let users add noise to
obfuscate bystanders selectively (selective obfuscation) [26], or the software on the
users and bystanders' devices might access protocols over wireless networks to
communicate privacy settings such that the software on the user device could
automatically hide bystanders' identifiable features based on these privacy settings
(collaborative obfuscation) [27]. The drawback of device-based obfuscation is that
bystanders might have no control on protecting their privacy because device-based
obfuscation methods rely on third-party devices for which bystanders have no control.

2.4 Design Issues and Performance Evaluation of Current Methods
Even though solutions to address the issue of bystanders' facial privacy have been
proposed in the past (as described in the previous sections), these solutions have issues
that depend on the type of method and their implementation. Some of these issues that
affect these solutions are as follows:
•

Usability: In human-computer interaction, usability is described as how easy a
system can be used by a typical consumer/user to fulfill its objectives. In systems
to enhance bystanders' facial privacy usable systems should minimize user
intervention by the bystander.

•

Power consumption: In any type of battery-powered system, power
consumption plays a substantial role because devices that deplete their battery
in a fast manner need to be recharged often. Since many solutions for
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bystanders' facial privacy protection involve the utilization of algorithms in
mobile devices, power consumption is an issue for these systems.
•

Effectiveness: Solutions to protect bystanders' facial privacy involve components
and algorithms to identify contexts/faces (to blur or obfuscate them), while
others involve extra devices or contraptions combined with intelligent
algorithms. Since these systems make use of artificial intelligence algorithms
(i.e., classification algorithms) to detect these contexts and/or faces, these
solutions may involve false detections or misclassifications which hinders the
effectiveness for the system to work correctly.
Table 1. Design issues for bystanders' facial privacy solutions.
Design Issue

Description

Rating

Usability

Is the method easy to use?

Low, Moderate, High

Power Consumption

Does the method require high

Low, Medium, High

power consumption?
Effectiveness

Is the method effective to

Low, Medium, High

protect bystanders?

Based on these issues, the methods available for bystanders' facial privacy are evaluated
by using the ratings for each category as presented in Table 1. The evaluated methods
along with their corresponding ratings are described in Table 2 below.
Table 2. Methods for bystanders' facial privacy protection
Method

Category

Usability

Power

Effectiveness

High

Low

Low

High

Low

Medium

Remarks

Location
BlindSpot
(disabling,
Capture-resistant
sensor
environment [18]
saturation)
Disabling devices
Location
via infrared [19]

Utilization of InfraRed (IR) light to
disable CCD sensors may not be
useful with IR filters on modern
cameras.
Method requires third-party
devices to receive IR commands
and software to disable sensors
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(disabling,

which not all third-party devices
may the capability.

sensor
saturation)
Location
Disabling devices
(disabling,
via Bluetooth

High

Medium

Medium

sensor
[20]
saturation)
Location
(disabling,
Virtual Walls [21]

Moderate

High

Medium

Moderate

Medium

Medium

High

High

Medium

High

High

Medium

sensor
saturation)
Location
Privacy-restricted

(disabling,

areas [22]

sensor
saturation)

Method requires third-party
devices to receive Bluetooth
commands and software to disable
sensors which not all third-party
devices may have the capability.
Method requires bystanders to
setup privacy rules that are
accessed in third-party devices. Use
of sensors in mobile device to
determine contexts may consume
large amounts of power.
Method requires bystanders to
setup privacy rules that are
accessed in third-party devices.
Proposed for unmanned aerial
vehicles.

Location
World-driven
(disabling,
access control
sensor
[28]

Method does not require
bystanders' intervention, but device
may not detect contexts correctly.

saturation)
Location
Sensor Tricorder

(disabling,

[29]

sensor
saturation)

Location
(disabling,
PlaceAvoider [30]

Moderate

High

Medium

sensor
saturation)

Obfuscationbased
NotiSense [23]

Moderate

Low

Medium

High

High

Low

High

Low

High

(bystanderbased)

Method does not require
bystanders' intervention, but device
may not detect contexts correctly.
Makes use of QR codes to encode
location privacy rules.
Require machine learning
algorithms to detect sensitive
contexts. May not detect contexts
correctly. Devices must have
software to detect contexts.
Requires third-party user
intervention to check if areas are
indeed sensitive.
Require third-party devices to
notify bystanders about possible
privacy violations and have the
bystander to take action to protect
their facial privacy.

Obfuscationbased
PrivacyVisor [24]
(bystanderbased)
PrivacyVisor III

Obfuscation-

[14]

based

Use of IR in wearables worn by
bystanders to obfuscate facial
features. IR can be blocked using
filters.
Use of reflective materials in
wearables used by bystanders to
corrupt photos taken about them.
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(bystanderbased)
ObfuscationPerturbed
based
eyeglass frames

High

High

Medium

(bystander[25]
based)
ObfuscationInvisibility

based

Glasses [31]

(bystander-

High

High

Low

based)
Privacy

Obfuscation-

Protection in

based

Google

(bystander-

StreetView [32]

based)

High

Low

High

Obfuscationbased
ObscuraCam [26]

High

High

Medium

(bystanderbased)
Obfuscationbased
l-pic [27]

Moderate

High

Medium

Moderate

High

Medium

High

Low

High

(bystanderbased)

ObfuscationPrivacyCamera

based

[33]

(bystanderbased)

Use of patterns in glasses' frames to
confuse facial recognition
algorithms. May be prone to
reidentification.

Use of IR in wearables worn by
bystanders to obfuscate facial
features. Need high power and IR
can be blocked using IR filters which
are available for mobile phones.
This technology does not depend
on the bystander but on the
company collecting photos.
Company performs obfuscation in
the cloud after the photos have
been forwarded from the device
that captured them.
This technology blur faces in photos
through a mobile app. Face blurring
occurs at the mobile phone and
depending of the blurring technique
bystanders could be re-identified.
Use of protocols between
bystander and third-party devices
to allow/deny blurring based on
privacy rules. Face blurring occur at
the mobile phone and depending of
the blurring technique bystanders
could be re-identified.
Use of protocols between
bystander and third-party devices
to allow/deny blurring based on
privacy rules. Face blurring occur at
the mobile phone and depending of
the blurring technique bystanders
could be re-identified.

ObfuscationRespectful

based

Cameras [34]

(bystanderbased)
Obfuscation-

Do Not Capture

based

[35]

(bystander-

Moderate

High

Medium

High

High

Low

based)
Invisible Light

Obfuscation-

Beacons [36]

based

Bystanders use visual colored cues
to inform capturing device of
privacy rules. Developed for fixed
cameras. Face is fully hidden.
Use of protocols between
bystander and third-party devices
to allow/deny blurring based on
privacy rules. Face blurring occur at
the mobile phone and depending of
the blurring technique the
bystanders could be re-identified.
Bystanders use wearable IR
beacons to inform capturing
devices of privacy rules. Mobile
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(bystander-

devices with IR filters will ignore the
signal sent by the beacons.

based)
ObfuscationNegative face

based

blurring [37]

(bystanderbased)

Moderate

Low

Medium

Once captured and stored, blurring
of bystanders' faces occur when
photos are presented through
social networks using stored privacy
rules.
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Chapter 3. System Description
3.1 FacePET System
In this section, we describe the Facial Privacy Enhancing Technology (FacePET) system
developed in conjunction with NSF REU students, Luis Y. Matos Garcia and Jaouad
Mouloud. The FacePET system is based on the idea that bystanders' facial privacy should
be handled by the bystander instead of relying on third-party devices to control
bystanders' facial privacy. To this end, we have developed a prototype of a smart
wearable device that uses visible light to create noise to distort the Haar-like features
used by face detection algorithms, therefore our wearable allows bystanders to protect
their privacy.
We have incorporated a Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) microcontroller that controls when
the lights are enabled/disabled based on privacy rules established by the bystander. The
goal on the utilization of the BLE microcontroller is for the bystander to provide consent
to third-party devices who may want to take photos of the bystander. Our work is
similar to the work of Yamada et al. [24] with the following differences:
•

In Yamada's work [24] the authors propose the use of near-infrared light to
saturate the Charged-Coupled Device (CCD) sensor of digital cameras to distort
the Haar-like features. In contrast, our work uses visible light. The reason to use
visible light is that newer cameras in smart phones (e.g., Apple's iPhone 4 and
newer) and other devices may include an IR filter that blocks the intended noise
if IR light is used. This makes their device unsuccessful in protecting bystanders'
facial privacy.

•

Our system includes a BLE microcontroller for the bystander to control an Access
Control List (ACL) in which the bystander can setup permissions for third-party
devices to take photos without the noise (disabling temporally the FacePET
wearable), hence creating a "smart" wearable.
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The development of a wireless protocol over Bluetooth that enables
communication between the bystander and third-party devices to provide and
exchange privacy consents.
FacePET wearable

Third-party
(stranger)
mobile phone

Bystander's
mobile phone

microcontroller
with power
supply

Goggles with
LEDs

Figure 5. FacePET system's hardware architecture.

3.2 FacePET System's Hardware Architecture
The hardware architecture of the FacePET system (presented in Figure 5) is composed of
the following components:
•

Goggles with LEDs: The goggles are equipped with LEDs that are turned on/off by
the microcontroller. To avoid physical discomfort to the bystander when using
the goggles and the LEDs are turned on, the goggles' lenses should have a filter
tuned to the wavelength of the LEDs on the goggles. The LEDs on the goggles are
connected to the BLE-enabled microcontroller through wires which also provides
power to them.

•

BLE-enabled microcontroller: This component controls the LEDs on the goggles
and connects to the bystander's mobile phone via Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE).
The microcontroller has its own power supply independent to the one in the
bystanders' mobile phone that also provides power to the LEDs. Depending on
the privacy protocols implemented, the microcontroller may have the software
that implements the ACL to disable the LEDs, or the ACL may be implemented at
the bystanders' mobile phone software. The FacePET wearable is composed of
the BLE microcontroller and the googles (as shown in Figure 5).
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•

Bystanders' mobile phone: The bystanders' mobile phone executes software that
configures the wearable's microcontroller. In addition to configure the wearable,
the bystanders' mobile phone executes software that provide consent to thirdparties to turn off the LEDs when an authorized third party wishes to take a
photo with the bystander in it. Depending on the privacy protocols
implemented, when an authorized third-party wishes to take a photo with the
bystander, the ACL may be implemented in the bystander's mobile phone or the
third-party may communicate directly with the wearable. The bystanders'
mobile phone communicates via BLE with the microcontroller and it
communicates with third-party mobile phones via Bluetooth. In future
implementations, this communication between smartphones may also be Wi-Fi
or IP-based communication.

•

Third-party (stranger) mobile phone: The third-party (stranger) mobile phone is
used by a third-party to request consent for photos to be taken of the bystander.
In our current implementation, these consents are requested via Bluetooth to
the bystanders' mobile phone prior to when the third-party can take a photo of
the bystander. If consent is given by the bystander, when the third-party mobile
phone takes a photo of the bystander, it communicates with the bystander
device again to request the LEDs of the goggles to be turned off (if consent has
been given previously).
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Figure 6. The FacePET wearable device, (a) Wiring sketch diagram for FacePET LEDs; (b) Goggles
with LEDs and BLE microcontroller; (c) FacePET wearable prototype worn by a bystander (the
person in the photo is Jaouad Mouloud)

In our current prototype we used safety goggles bought at a local hardware store. We
placed six LEDs on the goggles as shown in Figure 6(c). Initially we tried IR LEDs, but they
were discarded when we found that the Apple iPhone 4 and newer versions of the
iPhone include an IR filter for their rear-facing camera (possibly IR filters will become a
standard feature in future mobile phones). As a consequence, we tested red, green and
blue LEDs for our prototype. For the BLE-enabled microcontroller in the prototype, we
used an Arduino Uno [38] with the Seeed Studio Bluetooth 4.0 Low Energy-BLE Shield
v2.1 [39] (Figure 6(b)). The Arduino's power supply used was a battery pack connected
to the Arduino's USB-B port. Figure 6(a) shows the wiring sketch diagram for the
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Arduino board and the LEDs We used smartphones that support BLE and can run
Android 6 (or better).

3.3 FacePET System's Software Components
To control the FacePET wearable device and implement the bystanders' consent
protocol, we developed the following software:
•

FacePET microcontroller's software: In the current implementation of the
FacePET wearable, this component allows the functionality of turning on/off and
changing the intensity of the goggle's LEDs (in groups of two LEDs
independently) and providing a mechanism to control these LEDs from the
bystanders' mobile phone via Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE). Since we built the
wearable with the Arduino Uno and the Seeed Studio BLE Shield, the RBL_nf8001
and BLE-SDK Arduino libraries were used to create a Generic Attributes (GATT)
BLE server that is used to receive commands from the bystander's mobile phone.
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Devices

BYSTANDER

Device Name:
Device Address:

BLE Device
ED:09:38 CC:B0:66

Device Name:
Device Address:

5E:3C:36:4E:30:D8

, Device Name:
Device Address:

56:91 00:EE:1C:3S

Device Name:
Device Address:

72.37:BF:5F:64:94

Device Name:
{ Device Address:

4D:18:2E:BC:AF:BA

Device Name:
Device Address:

7F:B2:B5:1A:9E:A3

Device Name:
Device Address:

73:CE:5A:C8:84:09

iR LED
CONTROLLER

(a)

Figure 7. FacePET's system mobile app screenshots, (a) Bystanders' app; (b) Stranger (third-party)

•

FacePET bystander's mobile app: This application provides the bystander a
controller for the FacePET wearable via BLE to turn on/off and change the
intensity of the LEDs, it implements the ACL for the FacePET wearable, and it also
implements a Bluetooth protocol that provides the bystander wearing the
FacePET wearable device a mechanism to give consent to third-parties to take
photos. Initially, the FacePET bystanders' app scans for a FacePET wearable in
the area and once connected to it, it enables the LEDs in the wearable. The LEDs
stay powered on until the bystander turns them off, or a third-party FacePET
(stranger) mobile app with consent requests a photo to be taken. The protocol to
provide consent is described in section 3.4. Screenshots of this mobile app are
shown in Figure 7(a).
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•

FacePET third-party (stranger) mobile app: This app provides a third-party
(stranger) a mechanism to ask for consent to take photos from the bystander via
Bluetooth. Once consent is given, the app will send a command to the FacePET
bystander's mobile app to disable temporarily the FacePET wearable (as
described in section 3.4). Screenshots of this mobile app are shown in Figure
7(b).

3.4 FacePET System's Consent Protocol
As a bystander's surroundings and context may change over time, he/she may not
notice when somebody may be taking photos of him/her without consent. One of the
features and contributions of the FacePET system is the communication protocol that

((

•*

))

Third-party (stranger)
FacePET

mobile phone

wearable

j

Turn on

Scan for third-party

"Discoverability" in app

devices

Waiting for incoming

Waiting for commands |

| Third-party device found
and MAC saved in ACL

messages
Authorization message

Bystanders' Bluetooth
MAC saved

Waiting to authenticate

Send request for
authentication
(to take photo)

Third-party device
cleared

Authorization

Turn off LEDs

message/ Take photo

Photo taken

Photo taken
Turn on LEDs

Figure 8. Sequence diagram for FacePET's consent protocol.
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provides a bystander wearing the FacePET device a way to give consent, therefore
protecting the bystander's facial privacy and enabling a mechanism to create a list of
"trusted cameras" for the bystander.
The protocol (implemented over Bluetooth in our prototype and shown in Figure 8)
enables the bystander to control an ACL in the FacePET bystander's mobile app to
enable/disable the FacePET wearable's LEDs when a trusted third-party mobile phone
wants to take photos. Now, we will describe a scenario in which three personas, namely
Betsy (a bystander using the FacePET system), Trisha (a third-party using the FacePET
third-party app) and Steve (a third-party, stranger with a camera) interact at a party.
Initially, Betsy is wearing the FacePET system with the LEDs on. Trisha and Besty are
friends and trust each other. Trisha asks Betsy if she can take pictures of her during the
party, either by talking to her or through an Internet messaging app (e.g., WhatsApp). If
Betsy does not want Trisha to take photos, she simply ignores the message.
However, if Betsy desires to give consent to Trisha to take photos of her, Betsy replies to
Trisha by asking her to open the FacePET third-party (stranger) app and to press
"Discoverability", then the following steps take place over Bluetooth:
1.

Betsy opens the FacePET bystander's mobile app and scans for Bluetooth devices
to get Trisha's Bluetooth MAC address and device name.

2.

Once Trisha's device is found via Bluetooth, Betsy authorizes Trisha's device and
the bystander's app saves Trisha's Bluetooth MAC address and device name in a
file (Betsy's app adds Trisha's device to the ACL).

3.

Betsy's FacePET bystanders' app sends a message via Bluetooth to Trisha's
FacePET app notifying that her device is cleared to take photos of Betsy. At this
point Betsy's FacePET's app creates a Bluetooth server socket to wait for photo
requests from Trisha's FacePET app.

4. Trisha's app saves Betsy's Bluetooth address so it can be used later to request
Betsy's FacePET wearable's LEDs to be turned off (as long both mobile phone
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devices are in range and Betsy's FacePET mobile app still has Trisha's phone
authorized in the ACL).
Later in the party when Trisha wants to take a photo of Betsy, the following steps are
followed:
1. Trisha opens her FacePET mobile app. She presses the "Take Picture" button
and selects Betsy's device from the list. Trisha's device then sends an
authentication message to Betsy's device via Bluetooth.
2. The authentication message is received by Betsy's FacePET mobile app. The
mobile app then checks if the Trisha's device is authorized in the ACL. If it is,
then it notifies back to Trisha's app that her device can take the photo, and it
sends a message via BLE to Betsy's FacePET wearable to turn off the device.
Otherwise, Betsy's app will ignore the message and the LEDs will stay on.
3. Trisha takes the photo and then it sends a message back to Betsy's FacePET's
mobile app to turn on the LEDs again.
During the party, Steve (a stranger with camera) has tried to take photos of Betsy's face.
Since he doesn't have permission from Betsy, all the photos he takes from her will look
similar to Figure 6(c) thus protecting Betsy's facial privacy.
With the sensors in the bystander's mobile phone, more complex privacy rules could be
created to provide consent. For example, we tested a simple modification in which a
trusted camera can take only a certain number of photos and after the max number of
photos authorized has been reached for that camera, the FacePET wearable's LEDs will
remain powered on. Other contexts may include location, activity or time by modifying
the FacePET bystander's app to manage the ACL using context-based privacy rules.
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Chapter 4. FacePET Evaluation
4.1 Evaluation Goals
When creating the FacePET wearable device, we had two goals in mind that we wanted
to evaluate: usability and effectiveness. For usability, we wanted the interaction
between the user and the device to be as easy as possible. For the bystander to setup
and work the device as well as control their preferences in the application of who they
allow to take their picture should take minimal effort. The same goes for the
accompanying application for the stranger and their preference control. As for the
effectiveness of the device, the goal was to observe if the wearable device was effective
in protecting a bystander's facial privacy using the FacePET wearable independently of
the camera being used. The lights around the device are placed in such a way that they
hide the Haar-like features of the individual's face well enough to fool face detection
algorithms. These two goals were the main focuses of the device going forward into its
evaluation.

4.2 Methodology
In order to recruit and collect data from research participants, the necessary
Institutional Review Board (IRB) application needed to be filled out and approved. Upon
submission, the application was approved on the date of May 14, 2018 and given the
approval protocol number 18-108. The initial recruitment of participants was carried out
by the supervising professor, Dr. Alfredo J. Perez, who emailed the recruitment flyer to
professors in the Computer Science department. The flyer explained that individuals
who wanted to take part in the research study were to come to Room 123 in the
Synovus Center of Commerce and Technology building on the CSU campus.
Once the participants entered the room, they filled out the informed consent form so
that they understood what was taking place. Next, they filled out an initial survey about
the general concept of bystanders' privacy as well as their personal preferences on
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having their photos taken in certain situations. Then, the participants wore the FacePET
wearable device and had their photo taken with the device turned on and off. These
photos were then used as input in a Python script that makes use of the OpenCV face
detection API [40] which provides an open source implementation of the Viola - Jones
face detection algorithm. Lastly, the participants filled out a second survey regarding the
wearable device itself and how they felt about it, concluding their participation. A total
of 21 participants were surveyed in this study. The results from the study will be
presented using tables and graphs in the following section.

4.3 Results
4.3.1 Bystanders' Privacy Survey

The initial bystanders' privacy survey served as a way to gain information about each
participant's knowledge of what bystanders' privacy is and how it affects them.
Participants were first asked lead-up questions about if they considered themselves a
tech savvy person and how often they took pictures and videos. They were also asked
how much they knew about the issue of bystanders' privacy and if they found it to be an
important issue in today's world. The results to these questions will be discussed later in
section 4.4. The participants were then asked to imagine themselves being
photographed in certain situations and to choose the privacy action they would be most
comfortable with. These results are presented below in Table 3 and in Figure 9.
Table 3. Participants' preferred privacy actions regarding various situations.

Preference when 1
am...

At the gym

Preference B) 1

Preference C)

Preference A) 1

agree to be

Please obscure

Preference D) 1

Preference E) 1

agree to be

captured, but

my appearance

can decide my

do not wish to

captured in

please send me

in any

preference only

be captured in

any

a copy of any

photograph

after 1 see the

any

photograph.

photograph that

that includes

photograph.

photograph.

includes me.

me.

2

0

7

10

2
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Engaging in a daily
outdoor activity
(e.g. walking
7

4

5

3

2

1

1

4

12

3

At the beach

6

1

2

8

4
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9

2

1

7

2

6

2

1

5

7

8

0

4

6

3

At a hospital

4

0

3

5

9

In a restaurant

5

3

3
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0

8

5

1

4

3

8

6

3

4

0
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etc.)
In a bar or a
nightclub
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weddings, etc.)
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concerts, movies,
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Participants' Preferred Privacy Actions
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weddings, etc)
-•-at a public gathering (e.g. exhibitions, concerts, movies, etc.)

Figure

9. Chart of participants' preferred privacy actions regarding various situations.

After giving their privacy actions for certain situations, the participants were then asked
how some given factors would affect their comfort level when being photographed. This
was regardless of any specific situation. The results for this part of the survey are shown
below in Table 4 and in Figure 10. A final question put the participants in a
photographer's position and asked if they would like to respect the privacy preferences
of the people around them. These results will be discussed later on as well.
Table 4.

Participants' comfort levels regarding various factors.
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Comfort when...

Choice D) 1 will
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4
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Figure 10. Chart of participants' comfort levels regarding various factors.

4.3.2 Wearing the FacePET System

After participants were finished with the bystanders' privacy survey, they wore the
FacePET system and were explained to in detail how the Bystander and Stranger
applications worked. Each individual was photographed using the rear-facing camera of
an Apple iPhone 7 mobile phone with the device's lights turned on and off, and those
photos were used as input in the OpenCV face detection script to show how the device
could effectively hide the Haar-like features used in the face detection algorithm. Out of
the 21 tests done when taking pictures with the device's lights on, 6 of the participants'
faces were still partially or completely detected by OpenCV. This gives a success
percentage of around 71%.
A handful of the participants also took pictures using their own mobile phones so that
comparisons could be made for how effective the device worked regardless of the
different cameras. For the entire experiment, green LEDs were used for FacePET. The
results for face detections using different mobile phones are presented in Table 5 and

are a combined effort from the experiment described in this section and the
experiments of Luis Y. Matos Garcia and Jaouad Mouioud.
Table 5. Results from FacePET facial privacy protection with different rear-facing cameras
and OpenCV face detection library. FacePET wearable with green LEDs.
Mobile phone

Basic camera features

Face detected?

(Rear camera; Front Camera; IR filter)
Apple iPhone 6 Plus

R: 8 MP; F: 1.2MP;IR:Yes

No

Apple iPhone 7 Plus

R: 12 MP; F: 7 MP; IR: Yes

No

Apple iPhone 8

R: 12 MP; F: 7 MP; IR: Yes

No

Apple iPhone 8 Plus

R: 12 MP + 12MP (dual cameras); F: 7 MP; IR: Yes

No

Apple iPhone X

R: 12 MP; F: 7 MP; IR: Yes

No

Samsung Galaxy S7

R: 12 MP; F: 5 MP; IR: No

Yes

Samsung Galaxy S7 Edge

R: 12 MP; F: 5 MP; IR: No

No

Samsung Galaxy S8

R: 12 MP; F: 8 MP; IR: No

No

Samsung Galaxy S9

R: 12 MP; F: 8 MP; IR: No

No

Samsung Galaxy S9 Plus

R: 12 MP + 12MP (dual cameras); F: 8 MP; IR: No

No

Samsung Note 7

R: 12 MP; F: 5 MP; IR: No

No

Samsung Note 8

R: 12 MP + 12MP (dual cameras); F: 8 MP; IR: No

No

Asus ZenFone 3 Max

R: 16 MP; F: 5 MP; IR: No

No

Asus ZenFone 4

R: 12 MP + 8MP (dual cameras); F: 8 MP; IR: No

No

OnePlus 6

R: 16 MP + 8MP (dual cameras); F: 16 MP; IR: No

Yes

Motorola Moto G (2nd Gen)

R: 8 MP; F: 2 MP; IR: No

No
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4.3.3 Wearable Device Survey

The final part of the study had the participants complete a wearable device survey
about the FacePET system. It questioned the participants about the usability of the
device, if the device was something that they would use daily and if not, would they use
a similar version of the device. If a participant decided they would not wear a similar
version of the device, they could give their reasons as to why that is. The next question
asked them what they think the reactions of people would be when seeing them
wearing the device. They were also asked that if wearables that concealed users'
identities became available, will they allow smart glasses to become more popular.
Finally, the survey concluded by asking participants if there were any improvements to
the FacePET system that they would recommend. Results to these questions will also be
discussed in the next section.
4.4 Discussion of Results
4.4.1 Bystanders' Privacy Survey Discussion

The first set of questions in the bystanders' privacy survey were able to give insight into
participants' practices and knowledge with regards to technology and bystanders'
privacy. Out of the 21 total participants, 19 of them considered themselves to be tech
savvy while 2 of them thought not so much. When asked how often they took pictures,
videos, etc., 3 participants said very often, 4 said pretty often, 4 said often, 8 said not so
often, and 2 said very little. The participants were then asked specifically about the issue
of bystanders' privacy and how much they knew of it. Surprisingly, most of them did not
know much about the issue if anything at all with 2 saying they knew a lot about it, 8
said they knew enough, 8 did not know much, and 3 participants did not even know
what it was. In today's world, this issue is more evident than it has ever been, yet most
people still do not know it exists. With that aside, most of the participants were in
agreement that it is an important issue in today's world with 18 having said it was, and 3
saying it was not.
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Moving on to the preferred privacy actions chosen by the participants when in certain
situations presented in Table 3 and Figure 9, most of them preferred to either make
their decision about the photo after seeing it or they do not wish to be captured in any
photo in places such as the gym or in a hospital. In other situations, such as in a bar or
nightclub or at a restaurant, most of the participants preferred to make a decision about
the photo after seeing it above the other preferences. When at private or public
gatherings, the participants are more open to having any photo taken of them, or if a
photo is taken then they would want a copy of it. This is understandable since at private
gatherings, an individual is surrounded by trusted family and friends, while at public
gatherings, such as exhibitions and concerts, almost anyone around will have their
phone out taking photos and videos of the event.
Looking at Table 4 and Figure 10, the participants were presented with a new set of
questions about how comfortable they would be with different factors affecting them
when being photographed. In the presence of a professional photographer or if the
photographer was an acquaintance, a majority of the participants chose that they would
feel a bit more comfortable if not much more comfortable with having their photo
taken. If the factor is that there are minor children in the vicinity who may also be
photographed, the photographer is a stranger, or the participant is photographed with
strangers, the comfort levels of the participants mainly decreased with them feeling
either the same, a bit less comfortable, or much less comfortable. Having minor children
captured in photos can be a very sensitive issue depending on varying factors, and when
the photographer is a stranger, or an individual is being photographed with strangers,
other privacy issues come into play since other people who are not trusted are handling
the captured images.
4.4.2 FacePET System Experiment Discussion

It was stated before that of the 21 consecutive pictures taken of the participants' faces,
6 of them were still detected by OpenCV. This is good, but it calls into what factors
might be causing almost a third of the faces to be detected. During some of the studies,
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it was noticed that the glasses seemed a bit big on some of the participants who had
thinner or smaller facial structures. This caused more of the Haar-like features to still be
seen through the lenses themselves rather than being blocked in the areas where the
LEDs were. There was also an issue with the lighting of the area, where some of the light
reflections were mistakenly caught by OpenCV as maybe a glimmer of the eye. Different
lighting environments could have a significant effect on the effectiveness of the device.
Analyzing the results from Table 5, it can be seen that OpenCV was able to detect faces
only in photos taken with the Samsung Galaxy S7 and the OnePlus 6 mobile phones (2
out of 16 devices tested). This shows that using green LEDs for FacePET is effective in
protecting a bystander's facial privacy. Before this experiment, it could be assumed that
nicer mobile phone cameras would make it difficult for FacePET to work properly since
more detail could be captured. That is certainly not the case seeing as the Apple iPhone
8, iPhone X, and the Samsung Galaxy S9 all came out within the past few years or so and
OpenCV still could not detect the faces of individuals.
Regarding the actual uses of the applications for FacePET (the Stranger app in
particular), the functionality worked smoothly until the stranger wanted to take a
picture. Even when having permission from the bystander to take their picture, the
camera would not open up at all on occasion. This could be due to communication
errors between the Stranger and Bystander applications, or it could be a software issue
which can be fixed.
4.4.3 Wearable Device Survey Discussion

Fiaving had a chance to see how the FacePET system worked, 17 of the 21 participants
found the device easy to understand and use, while only 4 found it more difficult. This
means that the layout and functionality of the applications was made easy enough for
the majority of users to pick up in a small amount of time. When asked if the device was
something the participants would use daily, 9 said yes while the other 12 said no. Out of
those 12, they were asked if they would use a version similar to FacePET with 7 saying
yes and 5 saying no. Even though the original system is not something most of the
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participants would use, a majority of them would use a similar version. For those
participants who said no to using a similar version of the device, they were asked for
reasons as to why with some of the reasons including:
•

The current model is too big and draws attention

•

The model is not stylish and can obstruct vision

•

Select participants do not really take pictures or engage in the media market in
such a manner

•

Select participants would use a different form of the device, such as a watch

Most of the concerns or reasons surrounding participants not wanting to use the device
seem to be because of the devices form factor. Some of the participants who had
thinner/smaller facial features found the device sliding down their face, or due to the
surface area of the device's lenses compared to some users' faces, most of the
identifying facial features could still be picked up by OpenCV as stated previously.
When the participants were asked how people would react when seeing them wearing
the device, a variety of responses were given such as:
•

Person laughs and says, "Stupid glasses."

•

People would stare a lot

•

People would be confused at first or creeped out

•

People would ask why the user was wearing such a device

•

The device would only invite more people to take pictures of it

It seems there would be plenty of confusion around the purpose of the device and why
anyone would wear it in its current state. Despite the possible reactions to wearing such
a device, a majority of the participants did agree that if wearables that conceal users'
identities became available, it would allow smart glasses to become more popular with
17 saying yes, 3 feeling indifferent, and only 1 saying no.
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To gather some suggestions as to how to improve FacePET, the participants were asked
to provide any that they would recommend. Some of the improvements that were
repeated among most of the responses included:
•

A smaller size of the wearable glasses

•

More LEDs to cover more features, or make them less noticeable

•

Make the device more fashionable/stylish

•

Fix the wiring

The consensus appears to be that FacePET does not match up with the form factor of
regular glasses currently available. In order for more people to like wearing the device,
they need to look more closely to the types of glasses worn in today's world. This is not
to say that some people would not like the current form of the device but changing the
style would improve its chances of being popular among consumers.
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Chapter 5. Conclusion and Future Work
In this thesis, we have explored deeper into the growing issue surrounding bystanders'
privacy by understanding the various algorithms used in face detection as well as
evaluating current privacy solutions implemented by researchers over the past years.
We were also presented with a description and implementation of the FacePET system
which enables the bystander to hide the Haar-like features used by facial detection
algorithms by using visible light (green LEDs). Lastly, we analyzed and discussed the
results of a study carried out to gain an understanding of individuals' privacy
preferences, and to evaluate the FacePET system's usability and effectiveness when
used by those individuals. Thanks to this study, we were able to conclude that the
majority of the individuals who partook would be willing to wear FacePET, or a similar
device, daily for their facial privacy protection, and that if there is an availability of
wearables that can conceal users' identities, smart glasses could become more popular.
There is plenty of work to do in the future when it comes to the FacePET system. Plans
to improve the system include optimizing its power consumption, changing its form
factor in later iterations, and the development of context-based rules that may allow
the bystander to setup privacy rules based on location, time and/or activity recognition.
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